The Battle of the “Century”
After the end of the Second World War in the middle of the twentieth century, the United States of America rose to unprecedented heights of wealth and global influence, entering an era widely declared the "American Century." Yet, beneath the apparent calm of Western dominance, the seeds of a profound shift germinated in the East. As we transitioned into the 21st century, the hierarchy between the U.S. and Asia began to reverse, causing a change from a unipolar American dominance to a more multipolar world stage.
The concept of the "Asian Century" gained momentum through the ascendance of the Four Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. These nations exemplified Walt Rostow's theory of economic stages, shifting their focus from agriculture to industry, a trajectory that seemed to mirror the American growth model. The late twentieth-century anxieties surrounding Japanese dominance in technology and automotive sectors shifted towards a broader apprehension towards China and Korea, whose increasing economic and military capabilities presented a new challenge to American hegemony.
Set against these global challenges and transformations, "A Promised Land" by Barack Obama, published in 2020, documents the former U.S. President's early political life, historic 2008 presidential campaign, and first term in office. In chapter 20 of the book, Obama provides insights about the United States' interactions with Asia, focusing on China's strategic rise in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.
Obama introduces U.S.-China relations in his book by talking about surveillance. He discusses the extensive surveillance capabilities of China, highlighting incidents where Chinese intelligence operations intruded into personal and diplomatic spaces. Obama's recollection of these espionage activities is devoid of hostility. Instead, he recognizes similar behavior by the United States, stating, "We had too much business to do with the Chinese—and did enough of our own spying on them—to want to make a stink."
His admission of America's own engagement in surveillance activities brings to light the platter his predecessors served him up—mutual distrust bound by mutual necessity. Economic interdependence calls for engagement with one another despite deep-seated mistrust. This sets the stage for the vital concern that Obama shares: "what China's resurgence meant for … America's position in the world." As China's global influence grows, the U.S. must recalibrate its strategies to maintain its standing without escalating tensions unnecessarily.
Obama attributes China's foreign policy to Deng Xiaoping, the architect of modern China's economic reforms, who famously advised China to "hide [its] strengths, [and] bide [its] time." China, following suit, avoided open conflict while building its economic and global influence. Interestingly, Deng, during a meeting in 1988 with the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, famously downplayed the notion of an imminent "Asian Century." Specifically, he said, "In recent years, people have been saying that the next century will be the century of Asia and the Pacific as if that were sure to be the case. I disagree with this view," staying true to his cautious, restrained approach to China's rise on the global stage.
Obama notes that central to this strategy of China was its focus on economic growth without exporting its political ideology. Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China's Communist Party did not attempt to export communism but focused instead on economic engagement. This enabled China to integrate deeply into the world economy while maintaining its system of government. Obama's narrative suggests that Deng's legacy was pivotal in shaping a China that was potent yet prudent, powerful yet patient. This patient China showed powerful restraint; even when the U.S. sold arms to Taiwan, it opted for political pressure over military confrontation. China's relations with other global powers remained complex but stable and kept growing.
Obama continues to talk about the aggressive economic strategies employed by China, such as state subsidies, currency manipulation, and trade dumping, which helped it climb the global market. As with the surveillance, though, he acknowledges that these practices were not unique to China and that many nations, including the U.S., have historically used similar tactics to protect or enhance their economic standings at various stages of development. This provided a backdrop for understanding Obama's approach to international monetary policy. Obama depoliticizes China's financial policies and instead recognizes them as part of a universal playbook of economic advancement.
All of this is to say Obama was not surprised by any of it. What he cared most about was the lack of a response from previous U.S. administrations. Upon entering office, he found an established pattern of minimal confrontation with China because the U.S. profited from its non-confrontation with China. The farmers were selling soy, the Wall Street Giants were minting money, and the Walmart shelves were overflowing with Chinese-made flat-screen TVs. (Almost) everybody was (mostly) happy … except Obama, who wanted to slap China's wrist and "nudge [him] toward better behavior."
Obama's dilemma regarding China, in some ways, represents America's reaction to the "Asian Century." He says, "To pull ourselves and the rest of the world out of the recession, we needed China growing, not contracting." Keeping China in a state of growth was essential for global economic stability, yet keeping America as the star of the century was crucial. The themes explored in Ikenberry's "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?" resonate deeply with these reflections. Both texts grapple with the shifts in global power dynamics, particularly with regard to China's ascension and the implications for the established liberal international order—an order that Obama, during his presidency, aimed to strengthen and adapt in response to new geopolitical realities. As Asia rises, the question of how the West, specifically the United States, under leaders like Obama, navigates this shift becomes critical. Obama's reflections about the strategic pivots during his administration are practical illustrations of Ikenberry's theoretical concerns about managing China's rise within the existing order.
Obama's administration tried to strengthen ties with ASEAN countries; this approach is part of a bigger U.S. strategy called "pivot to Asia," which aimed at reinforcing American presence and partnerships in Asia to ensure a stable power balance and keep any single power, including China, from dominating the region in ways that would threaten peace and stability. This strategy directly aligns with Ikenberry's thesis that maintaining a stable and inclusive international order requires the integration and cooperation of rising powers.
Obama recalls an interaction with the Japanese Emperor and Empress during his visit. He reveals a certain empathy for the Empress. Still, the interaction serves as a microcosm of the broader themes Obama addresses in his foreign policy reflections, particularly the idea that countries could, by following the U.S. lead—liberalize their economies and potentially their political systems—achieve greater prosperity and autonomy. Despite their royal status, there's an undercurrent in Obama's portrayal of a confined existence dictated by rigid structures, suggesting that even those at the peak of power can feel the limitations of a non-liberalized system. This anecdote resonates even today, as highlighted by figures like Meghan Markle, whose experiences echo the challenges of navigating traditional roles within modern expectations.
Obama's recount of his formal interactions with Chinese President Hu Jintao captures the essence of his diplomatic approach. He describes a rigid atmosphere, where he showed broader strategic patience and respect for diplomatic protocol when faced with communication that seemed more performative than substantive. His memoir was published in 2020—when U.S. foreign policy under Trump had taken a decidedly more aggressive and erratic turn with China. Perhaps Obama is implicitly advocating for the important role of diplomacy, even when laborious, in maintaining international stability and fruitful negotiations. This complements Ikenberry's advocacy for a robust, rule-based international order that accommodates rising powers like China through engagement rather than confrontation.
This international order isn't new; it was around even in 1937 when Carl Crow's book "400 Million Customers" provided an account of American perceptions of China in the early twentieth century. In his stories, American businesses, like many others from the West, viewed China primarily as a vast market ready to consume cheaply priced goods without much consideration for quality or specificity. These businesses failed to recognize the importance of cultural and consumer nuances, leading to unsuccessful attempts to impose Western products on a sophisticated market. In Crow's, Obama's, and Ikenberry's articles, we see a thematic continuity in the challenges the West faces in understanding and integrating with China. This continuity reflects a universal aspect of human behavior: despite the passage of time and the evolution of global dynamics, the fundamental challenges of cross-cultural understanding and respect persist.
On the theme of cross-cultural understanding, was "The World of Suzie Wong." It showcases how Westerners often viewed Asian societies as exotic and oriental. The socio-political landscape of 1950s Hong Kong, as a British colony on the brink of transformation, is the backdrop for the movie. This era was depicted in the film by the push-and-pull between traditional values and the pressures of modernization. In some ways, it is similar to how Obama talks about Singapore in his autobiography. "Singapore, though, with its wide boulevards, with its wide boulevards, public gardens, and high-rise office buildings, was hardly the tidy former British colony I remembered for childhood." While the film reflects a standard narrative of the 1960s, where Western characters are depicted as rescuers amidst the perceived backwardness and corruption of Asian countries, Obama's 2008 policies mirror this narrative by letting other countries "share in [their] prosperity" by following the American way.
In more recent times, the California caste bill, intended to add caste as a protected category in anti-discrimination laws, was vetoed. This shows that just as American perceptions of China in the early 20th century and mid-century Hong Kong showed a lack of cultural understanding and the consequent misrepresentations and exclusions, American perceptions of India in the 21st century show an absence of understanding nuanced social issues and translating them into legal frameworks.
This shows the need for more informed and empathetic approaches to policy-making that genuinely reflect the complex human experiences of marginalized communities. It shows the need for an inclusive society that learns from past mistakes.
These examples reflect a historical continuum where cultural misunderstandings often lead to stereotyping, marginalization, and misguided policies. As we move deeper into the 21st century, whether it be the "Asian Century" or the "American," the lessons drawn from these episodes are clear: navigating this century will require us to honor and learn from the diversity of the human experience across time.
